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From the Three Natures to
the Two Natures
On a Fluid Approach to the Two Versions of

Other-Emptiness from Fifteenth-Century Tibet

Yaroslav Komarovski
University of Nebraska Lincoln

I
been a surge of scholarly interest in diverse
systems of Buddhist thought and practice that Tibetan thinkers characterize as “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong), contrasting them with systems of
“self-emptiness” (rang stong). While the theories of such exponents of otheremptiness as Dölpopa Sherap Gyeltsen (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan,
1292–1361)1 are relatively well known, those of other Tibetan thinkers are
only beginning to receive scholarly attention. This paper addresses one
such lesser-known other-emptiness theory that was developed by the
seminal Tibetan thinker Serdok Penchen Shakya Chokden (gser mdog pa
chen sh kya mchog ldan, 1428–1507).
Shakya Chokden articulated his position on other-emptiness in works
written during the last thirty years of his life. In those works he advocated
both Al k k rav da Yog c ra and Ni svabh vav da Madhyamaka systems
as equally valid forms of Madhyamaka, regarding the former as a system
of other-emptiness and the latter as a system of self-emptiness.2 Instead of
approaching the two systems as irreconcilable, he presented them as equally

78

Journal of Buddhist Philosophy, Vol. 2, 2016

valid and e ective, emphasized their respective strengths, and promoted one
or the other depending on context and audience. Partly for these reasons,
his own philosophical outlook does not neatly fall into the categories of
other-emptiness or self-emptiness, and placing him squarely into the camp
of “followers of other-emptiness” (gzhan stong pa)—as some advocates of
later sectarian traditions did—does not do justice to him as a thinker.3
According to Shakya Chokden, virtually all seminal Yog c ra
authors, such as Maitreya, Asa ga, and Vasubandhu, as well as leading
Buddhist logicians, such as Dign ga and Dharmak rti, were adherents of
Al k k rav da and, by extension, proponents of other-emptiness. This
assessment follows from his understanding of the distinction between
the two Yog c ra systems—Saty k rav da and Al k k rav da—that ultimately boils down to the question of the reality of mental appearances. In
Shakya Chokden’s opinion, although Yog c ras in general do not accept
the existence of an external material world, according to Saty k rav da
its appearances or “representations” (rnam pa, k ra) ref lected in
consciousness have a real or true existence, because they are of one
nature with the really existent consciousness, their creator. According to
Al k k rav da, neither external phenomena nor their appearances and
consciousnesses that reflect them really exist. What exists in reality is
only primordial mind (ye shes, jñ na). 4 Because only this latter position
represents the final Yog c ra view, according to Shakya Chokden, to
claim that any key Yog c ra thinker was a follower of Saty k rav da
would entail that he did not fully understand the final view of the
Yog c ra system.5
While presenting the nal view of reality held by key Yog c ra thinkers
as identical, Shakya Chokden was also aware that they were far from
being unanimous in their approaches to that view. He found two di erent
versions of that view in Yog c ra works, but insisted that both versions
are valid and do not contradict each other. Consequently, he himself did
not interpret the view of other-emptiness in one way only, but shifted
focus depending on what materials he was addressing. In the process,
he articulated a provocative approach to the three natures (ngo bo nyid
gsum, trisvabh va)—the key Yog c ra categories involved in its teachings
on reality—thereby contributing to our understanding of the diversity of
Yog c ra theories and their interpretations in subsequent commentarial
literature.
Discussion of speci c details of those theories and their comparison with
Shakya Chokden’s views are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless,
one important feature of Yog c ra writings should be mentioned. As is well
known to contemporary scholars, Indian Yog c ra texts are far from being
unanimous in their interpretations even of such key teachings as the three
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natures, allowing for multiple interpretations of those teachings by South
and East Asian commentators.6 Tibetans were very well aware of those
diverse positions, as well as the apparently con icting statements found at
times even in the same text. In their attempts to discern a deeper meaning
underlying that diversity (paint a coherent picture of Yog c ra thought and
place it into the broader context of Mah y na Buddhism), such thinkers
as Tsongkhapa Lopzang Drakpa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419)
and Dölpopa developed competing and highly ingenious commentarial
systems.7 Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of other-emptiness, too, was
formed in response to divergent positions contained in Yog c ra writings,
in particular, those dealing with the three natures. Let us now turn to his
interpretation of those positions.
In his Rain of Ambrosia, Shakya Chokden describes two di erent versions
of other-emptiness articulated in Yog c ra writings:
There emerged two dissimilar [approaches] regarding the mode of
identifying the subject-basis of other-emptiness. In the Yog c ra texts,
the reality, [understood as] the basis of emptiness, the dependent, being
empty of the object of negation, the imaginary, is explained as the
thoroughly established. In the Sublime Continuum and the Conquest over
Objections about the [Three] Mother Scriptures, the reality, the thoroughly
established, is explained as empty of the imaginary. [These] two also
[stem] from [interpretive] di erences: including all knowables into two,
the imaginary and thoroughly established, or dividing them into three:
[the imaginary, thoroughly established] and dependent. They are not
contradictory.8

As this passage demonstrates, Shakya Chokden traces the two interpretations of other-emptiness to two different sets of texts. One is
found in Yog c ra texts other than Maitreya’s Sublime Continuum of
Mah y na and Asa ga’s Explanation of [Maitreya’s] ‘Sublime Continuum
of Mah y na’.9 The other is found in these two texts as well as in the
Conquest over Objections about the [Three] Mother Scriptures attributed to
Vasubandhu. 10 Note that according to Shakya Chokden’s overall position
articulated in such texts as the Rain of Ambrosia, all the “Five Dharmas
of Maitreya”—including the Sublime Continuum and its commentary by
Asa ga—are Madhyamaka works of other-emptiness.11 Thus, the passage
should not be taken as implying that Yog c ra works contain only the
former approach.
The passage argues that the main difference between the two
approaches lies in dissimilar identi cations of the basis of emptiness
(stong gzhi) or the subject-basis of other-emptiness (gzhan stong gi gzhi
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chos can). This di erence is dictated by two dissimilar contexts: division
of all phenomena into the three natures (ngo bo nyid, svabh va) or the
two natures. The rst approach is a well-known Yog c ra position: the
dependent (gzhan dbang, paratantra) is taken as the basis of emptiness,
the imaginary (kun btags / kun brtags, parikalpita) is negated on that basis,
and that negation is explained as the thoroughly established (yongs grub,
parini panna). According to the second approach, the thoroughly established itself is taken as the basis of emptiness and explained as empty of
the imaginary. Despite these di erences, Shakya Chokden does not see the
two approaches as contradictory.
The Rain of Ambrosia points out that in the Sublime Continuum and
its commentary by Asa ga, the subject-basis of emptiness is explained as
the reality-limit (yang dag pa’i mtha’, bh tako i), that is, ultimate reality,
in contrast to other Yog c ra texts where the subject-basis of emptiness
is explained as the dependent. According to Shakya Chokden, Asa ga
interpreted other-emptiness di erently in his commentary on the Sublime
Continuum and the Summary of Higher Knowledge.12 Among other di erences, in the commentary on the Sublime Continuum he did not explain
the three characteristics (mtshan nyid gsum, trilak a a), that is, the three
natures. These interpretive di erences, Shakya Chokden argues, stem from
the di erent s tras explored in those texts.13
While there are many Yog c ra texts utilizing the terminology of the
three natures, the Sublime Continuum and its commentary by Asa ga
mention neither the imaginary and thoroughly established pair nor the
whole trio. Shakya Chokden was no doubt aware of this because he
commented on the Sublime Continuum separately 14 and also referred to
di erent passages from the text in many other works. Therefore, the
above reference to the two natures in the Sublime Continuum should not
be understood in terms of those categories per se but rather in terms of
the translation of the Sublime Continuum’s approach into those categories.
When the Sublime Continuum’s basic position that the ultimate is empty of
adventitious phenomena is translated into the Yog c ra categories of the
three natures, the ultimate can be treated only as the thoroughly established, while adventitious, conventional phenomena have to be subsumed
under the category of the imaginary.
What makes such translation possible in the first place is Shakya
Chokden’s basic claim that all major Yog c ra thinkers hold the same view
of reality and only use di erent terms and categories for approaching it.
Shakya Chokden also shared the broader Tibetan perspective on Buddhist
philosophical systems: regardless of which system one deals with, it should
be possible to classify all phenomena into two realities or truths: ultimate
truth (don dam bden pa, param rthasatya) and relative truth (kun rdzob
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bden pa, samv tisatya). Tibetan thinkers generally tend to subsume the
imaginary and dependent under the category of relative truth. Shakya
Chokden goes further and splits the dependent into two parts—the imaginary and thoroughly established—that are in turn equated with the relative
and ultimate truths respectively.
Shakya Chokden’s understanding of the nature of the two truths also
plays an important role in his interpretation of the three natures. His
basic position is that if something exists, it has to exist really and truly,
exist as reality and truth. Because relative truth does not exist truly, it
does not exist (although it appears to exist to deluded minds). 15 Translated
into the language of the three natures, it means that only the thoroughly
established exists—nothing else. Consequently, divisions of relative
phenomena—including those of the other two natures—are di erent types
of nonexistence, not existence. From this perspective, di erences between
the dependent and the imaginary, respectively, are similar to those between
dreams and dreams within dreams—neither of them exist from the point
of view of the wakeful state.
In order to understand how Shakya Chokden came up with this approach
we must take a closer look at his interpretation of the three natures.
We will then give special attention to the dependent that is clearly the
most pivotal (literally and metaphorically) and ambiguous of the three
natures: while the other two natures are retained in both theories of otheremptiness, it appears in the three natures theory but disappears in the two
natures theory.
Shakya Chokden addresses the three natures in many texts scattered
throughout the twenty-four volumes of his collected writings. Among those
works, especially helpful for our task is his Enjoyment Ocean of Scriptural
Statements and Reasoning, which provides very clear and succinct de nitions and divisions of the three natures.16 In its presentation of the three
natures, that text refers to such diverse sources as Asa ga’s Summary of
Mah y na, 17 Maitreya’s Di erentiation of the Middle and Extremes, 18 and
Vasubandhu’s Thirty Stanzas,19 clearly treating them as sharing the same
view and complementing each other.
The text gives the following de nition of the imaginary: “that which
appears—but is not established as it appears—to knowing dualistically
appearing as apprehended and apprehender due to predispositions.”20
Among its di erent divisions, the one that is relevant for the foregoing
discussion is the division into the apprehended-imaginary (gzung ba kun
btags) and the apprehender-imaginary (’dzin pa kun btags).21
The definition of the dependent is: “‘cognition that— due to
predispositions—dualistically appears as apprehended and apprehender,’
or ‘cognition that—due to those [predispositions]—appears as having
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representations of the three realms.’”22 Among its di erent divisions,
the one that is relevant for the foregoing discussion is the division into
the dependent with the characteristics of the apprehended and with the
characteristics of the apprehender (gzung dang ’dzin pa’i mtshan nyid
can), which are respectively the dependent appearing as objects, etc.,
and the dependent appearing as conceptual minds, etc., apprehending
those objects.23 Note that according to Shakya Chokden, all types of the
dependent are created by the power of the predispositions of dualistic
appearances. He therefore rejects its division into the pure dependent and
the impure dependent (dag pa’i gzhan dbang and ma dag pa’i gzhan dbang,
respectively) advocated by some thinkers.24 Arguing that no pure dependent
is possible, he e ectively rejects the possibility of the dependent becoming
the thoroughly established either prior to or after the realization of the
latter has taken place (more on this below).
Shakya Chokden de nes the thoroughly established as “suchness which
is empty of the imaginary on the basis of the subject [of emptiness], the
dependent” (chos can gzhan dbang gi steng du kun tu btags pas stong pa’i
de bzhin nyid). It is divided into the unchangeable thoroughly established
(’gyur ba med pa’i yongs grub), which is the factor of experience, clarity,
and cognition characterized by the negation of the imaginary (de bkag pas
khyad par du byas pa’i myong ba gsal rig gi cha), and the non-erroneous
thoroughly established (phyin ci ma log pa’i yongs grub), which is the
primordial mind of the meditative equipoise of ryas that directly realizes that unchangeable thoroughly established (de mngon sum du rtogs pa’i
’phags pa’i mnyam gzhag ye shes). Note that in the above de nition of the
thoroughly established Shakya Chokden places emphasis on suchness, to
wit, primordial mind, which is empty of the imaginary. Nevertheless, the
dependent is retained as the basis of that emptiness. We will return to
this point when discussing the relationship between the two approaches
to other-emptiness.
Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of the three natures allows for a few
overlaps. First, the two divisions of the thoroughly established overlap: in
the context of meditative equipoise of Mah y na ryas, the non-erroneous
thoroughly established and the unchangeable thoroughly established have
the same nature: experience, clarity, and cognition characterized by the
negation of the imaginary are inseparable characteristics of the primordial
mind of the meditative equipoise of ryas.25 Second, the imaginary and
dependent overlap among themselves: the apprehender-imaginary has the
same nature as consciousness that projects dualistic appearances. This
being said, no overlap is possible between the dependent and thoroughly
established. I will address these two latter points below, when elaborating
on the ambiguous status of the dependent.
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In the Great Path of Ambrosia of Emptiness, Shakya Chokden presents
further details of the other-emptiness mode of relationship between the
three natures:
The basis that is empty is the dependent: all knowing that has dualistic
appearance of the apprehended and apprehender (gzung ’dzin gnyis snang
can gyi shes pa). The object of negation is the imaginary. It is of two
types, due to the division into the apprehended (gzung ba, gr hya) and
the apprehender (’dzin pa, gr haka). Each of these two, the apprehended
and apprehender, also has two [subdivisions]: in terms of persons and
in terms of phenomena .The way in which [phenomena] are empty is
[as follows:] the basis of negation is empty of the object of negation in
terms of other-emptiness, not in terms of self-emptiness. This is because
in relation to the bases of negation, i.e., the two types of dualistically
appearing knowing (gnyis snang gi shes pa), the objects of negation, i.e.,
the two types of apprehended and apprehender, are other entities (gzhan
gyi ngo bo); they are not posited as the own entities (rang gyi ngo bo) of
those [bases of negation].26

From this perspective of other-emptiness, the dependent, namely,
consciousnesses with dualistic appearances, is taken as the basis of emptiness/basis of negation. The imaginary, that is, all dualistic appearances of
persons and phenomena appearing as objects and subjects apprehending
those objects, is taken as the object of negation. In other words, consciousnesses with dualistic appearances both appear as the imaginary and are
empty of it at the same time. In this approach, the nonexistent entity of the
imaginary is posited as di erent from—or other than—the existent entity
of the dependent. This is the theory of other-emptiness, because it treats
the entities of the basis of negation and the object of negation as di erent.
(Shakya Chokden contrasts this position with the self-emptiness approach
that takes the basis of negation and the object of negation as the same,
treating all phenomena as being empty of themselves.) 27
Note that the above passage also suggests an overlap between the
dependent and imaginary: mind that has dualistic appearances of the
apprehended and apprehender is none other than the apprehender. As
Shakya Chokden puts it in the Rain of Ambrosia: “[T]he word ‘apprehender’
is explained as [referring] to that very mind which appears as the apprehended and apprehends that [appearance].”28 Further citations from Shakya
Chokden’s works below will clarify this point.
But if the dualistically appearing consciousness is both the dependent
and imaginary, then how can the dependent be empty of the imaginary in
terms of other-emptiness and not self-emptiness, how can the dependent
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and imaginary have di erent entities, and nally, what is the “own entity”
of the dependent? To answer these questions, we have to take a closer look
at Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of the dependent in the Al k k rav da
system.
In contrast to the other two natures—the thoroughly established that
ultimately exists and the imaginary that does not exist at all (although like
an illusion, it appears to exist)—the dependent has neither an independent
existence nor, for that matter, an independent nonexistence. In other words,
it is nothing more than a provisional conglomerate of the other two natures
with no separate entity of its own. Shakya Chokden explains this point
in the Ocean of Scriptural Statements and Reasoning where, invoking the
authority of Asa ga’s Summary of Mah y na, he writes that the dependent
“belongs to both parts” (gnyis ka’i char gtogs), being comprised of the
imaginary and thoroughly established. The part of dualistic appearance
(gnyis snang gi cha) of the dependent is subsumed under the imaginary,
while its part of clarity and cognition (gsal rig gi cha) is subsumed under
the thoroughly established. By itself, the dependent does not have a separate entity:
In the Summary of Mah y na too, having explained that the dependent
“belongs to both parts,” [Asa ga further] explained that [its] part of
dualistic appearance is subsumed under the imaginary, while its part
of clarity and cognition is subsumed under the thoroughly established.
Apart from those two, [the dependent itself] was not taught [by Asa ga]
as truly established.29

The Summary of Mah y na passage that Shakya Chokden is referring to
goes as follows: “The imaginary nature present in the dependent nature
belongs to the thoroughly a icted part. The thoroughly established nature
present [in the dependent nature] belongs to the puri ed part. As for the
dependent itself, it belongs to both parts.”30
Note that Shakya Chokden is not arguing that the dependent exists even
though it does not exist truly. Rather, he argues that apart from the other
two natures the dependent does not exist at all. This point is made clear
by the following passage from the Snatching Away the Heart’s Torments,
where he explains that according to Al k k rav da, both the apprehended
and apprehender are the imaginary, only nondual primordial mind is the
ultimate, and no dependent can be identi ed apart from them:
On the level of the nal tenets of Yog c ra texts
Both the apprehended and apprehender are [treated as] the imaginary part,
And only non-dual primordial mind is [treated as] the ultimate.
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If not a single dependent can be identi ed apart from those,
What is a chance [for it to be] truly existent?31

In the Answers to Three Universally Known Questions he also writes:
As for the dependent, it is determined as [being splittable] into two parts:
the part of mistaken dualistic appearance and the part of experience,
clarity, and cognition. The rst one is called the “apprehender-imaginary,”
while the second is subsumed under the thoroughly established. This is
why, as it has been explained in the Summary of Mah y na, no dependent
exists apart from the thoroughly established.32

The statement that the dependent does not exist apart from the thoroughly established should not be read as implying that the former can be
subsumed under or overlaps with the latter. On the contrary, it means that
the only real part of the dependent—clarity and cognition—is the thoroughly established, not the dependent. As Shakya Chokden puts it in the
Appearance of the Sun, “The clarity and cognition part has been explained
as the thoroughly established; [it] is not explained as the dependent.”33
Although the dependent is comprised of the other two natures, it is
posited primarily in terms of the imaginary. From the Ocean of Scriptural
Statements and Reasoning:
The main [feature] of the dependent is posited in terms of [its] part of
stains of dualistic appearances. It is not posited in terms of the part of
[its] entity—clarity and cognition. This is because that very [part] is the
main [feature] of the thoroughly established.34

In other words, because clarity and cognition are the key characteristics
of the thoroughly established they cannot be used to posit the dependent. Dualistic appearances, on the other hand, are taken as the de ning
characteristics of the dependent although, as we already know, they are
the primary characteristics of the imaginary too. This relates to a point
made earlier: that the dependent overlaps with the imaginary but not with
the thoroughly established. The former overlap is possible and the latter
impossible because both the imaginary and the dependent are produced by
the power of predispositions of dualistic appearances, while the thoroughly
established is not. Thus, although the two parts that comprise the dependent are subsumed under—or in fact are—either of the other two natures,
the dependent overlaps only with the imaginary.
But if the dependent does not have a separate existence, how can it have
its own entity which is di erent from the imaginary? The answer to this
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question, paradoxical as it is, is that the entity of the dependent is not the
dependent. As Shakya Chokden puts it in the Snatching Away the Heart’s
Torments,
Although the entity of the dependent is accepted,
Its entity is not it 35

Although the dependent does not have a separate existence apart from the
other two natures, and although it does not truly exist, it does have an
entity that is truly existent. That truly existent entity is none other than
primordial mind, the thoroughly established. From the Ocean of Scriptural
Statements and Reasoning:
The explanation of the entity of the dependent as truly established does
not establish that very [dependent itself] as truly established. This is
because its ultimate entity does not transcend the thoroughly established.36

This position allows for the dependent to be unreal but exist by nature and
have a truly existent entity. Because the two natures’ entities are di erent,
it also allows for the dependent to be empty of the imaginary nature in
terms of other-emptiness, not self-emptiness.
According to Shakya Chokden, the position that having a real or ultimate
entity or nature does not entail being itself real or ultimate is similar to
that of proponents of self-emptiness, who explain the emptiness of a pot
as the ultimate nature or reality of a pot, but do not accept the pot itself
as ultimate reality. He refers to this approach as an example in order to
reiterate his position in the Yog c ra context. From the Rain of Ambrosia:
The dependent being truly established is not a tenet of honorable Asa ga,
because in his texts that [dependent] was explained as [being] like an illusion. That [dependent] does not become truly established [simply] because
its entity was explained as truth. This is like the case of explaining the
entity of a pot, etc., as reality [while not accepting a pot, etc., as reality].37

Shakya Chokden assigns this position paramount importance for understanding the view of other-emptiness, writing in the Great Path of Ambrosia
of Emptiness:
[T]he non-contradictory explanation of the dependent as existent by
nature and [at the same time] being truthless like an illusion should be
understood as the key that opens the [treasury of] thatness of the texts of
proponents of other-emptiness.38
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He further argues that as long as one accepts the dependent as truly
established, one has no chance to a rm the emptiness of the apprehended/
apprehender duality. Without that, in turn, one cannot access the essence
of the nal de nitive meaning of the ocean of Yog c ras’ texts (rnal
’byor spyod gzhung rgya mtsho yi nges don mthar thug snying po) 39 —the
Al k k rav da view of reality. 40 To fully understand it, one has to realize
that the dependent is like an illusion in its not being truly established.
Despite its illusory nature, Shakya Chokden strongly objects to the interpretation of the dependent as self-empty. From the Great Path of Ambrosia
of Emptiness:
[T]here is no proof and there are factors damaging to the description
of the dependent in terms of self-emptiness. There is no proof, because
no such explanation is given in those scriptures [of Asa ga, Maitreya,
and others]. Damaging factors exist: if the entity of the dependent were
not truly established, the entity of the thoroughly established, reality,
would not be truly existent. This is because thatness free from duality of
apprehended and apprehender (gzung ’dzin gnyis med kyi de kho na nyid)
is asserted as the entity of dualistically appearing knowing (gnyis snang gi
shes pa’i ngo bo). That [thatness] is explained as the entity of that [dualistically appearing knowing] by the text [of Dharmak rti’s Commentary
on Valid Cognition: “Thus,] that [emptiness of duality] is the thatness
of that.”41

In this passage Shakya Chokden argues that although dualistically
appearing minds are unreal, nevertheless they are not lacking their own
entity or nature. This is because their own entity is not themselves, but
the thoroughly established. Therefore, to treat them as self-empty in this
context would imply the nonexistence of their entity, which in turn would
imply the nonexistence of the thoroughly established. This is why the
dependent cannot be treated as self-empty.
What is the nature of relationship between the dualistically appearing
consciousness and its entity described as the thoroughly established, and
why does Shakya Chokden insist so strongly on their separation? The
following passage from his commentary on the Sublime Continuum, the
Previously Unseen Sun, provides the answers:
Every phenomenon of a mistaken consciousness has the factor of the
inward-looking primordial mind [related with it]. Nevertheless, it is
impossible for the clarity factor of primordial mind (ye shes kyi gsal
cha) to become the entity of consciousness, and it is also impossible
for that [entity of consciousness] to become that [clarity factor of
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primordial mind]. Otherwise, it would follow that primordial mind is
an experiencer of worldly pleasures and su erings. [Also,] it would
follow that those unreal ideations (yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa,
abh taparikalpa) that bear the name of consciousness, are the very basis
of accomplishment of all stainless positive qualities. Without that original
primordial mind (gdod ma’i ye shes), adventitious consciousness (blo bur
gyi rnam shes) does not emerge as mistaken appearances. Nevertheless,
the possibility of a common locus (gzhi mthun) of the two is not asserted.
[Rather, they are] similar to clouds in the sky, oxide on gold, and dirt
in pure water.42

As this passage makes clear, Shakya Chokden does not want to allow any
overlap between—or mixture of—primordial mind and dualistic consciousness. Rather, he argues that the two exist side by side as two polarities
that never mix to assume the same nature. Clouds and sky never become
one, nor rust and gold, nor even dirt and water. They can coexist, but can
never completely blend.
Note that in this passage Shakya Chokden says that the clarity factor of
primordial mind cannot become or turn into the entity of consciousness
while, as pointed out earlier, he also argues that the thoroughly established
is the entity of the dependent. The two statements should not be taken as
contradictory, because one is meant to indicate that the two natures cannot
become a single entity (hence the notion of a common locus in the above
passage), while the other indicates that one nature has or possesses the
other nature without the two becoming one (hence the earlier notion that
the entity of the dependent is not the dependent).
But if primordial mind and dualistically appearing consciousness do
not assume each other’s nature, while the factors of clarity and cognition
are exclusive qualities of primordial mind only, then will it not follow that
dualistic consciousness lacks these two key characteristics—clarity and
cognition—and therefore is not di erent from inanimate matter? Shakya
Chokden provides a truly striking answer to this question, which sheds
more light on his uid approach to other-emptiness:
Objection: If consciousness’s own entity is not accepted as clarity and
cognition, then it will not cognize objects because of [having absurdly
turned into inanimate] matter.
Answer: No [such] absurd consequence will apply [here]: in general, it is
accepted that although consciousness is not established by valid cognition,
because of a mistake it is only superimposed as existent. It is not accepted
even as existent—how much less a cognition—precisely because it is a
relative truth.43
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Shakya Chokden makes it clear that similar to the dualistic appearances it
produces, dualistically appearing consciousness does not exist. It does not
exist because it is a relative truth. Only ultimate truth, nondual primordial
mind exists. If dualistic consciousness existed, then without the qualities
of clarity and cognition it would indeed become an inanimate matter.
Nevertheless, since it does not exist, the question whether it is clear and
cognizing simply does not apply. In the end we are left with only one
existent thing: primordial mind. Nothing else exists.
This position helps answer the question of why Shakya Chokden treats
the two approaches to other-emptiness as noncontradictory. The main
reason is that although the dependent is not self-empty, and although it is
used as the basis of negation of the imaginary, when the latter has been
negated on its basis, it does not remain either. From the Rain of Ambrosia:
[Al k k rav da] Yog c ras explain that the imaginary is empty of its own
entity, the dependent is empty of other entities, and what is left in remainder
of that [emptiness] as not being empty of one’s own entity is that very entity
of the dependent which is otherwise called the “thoroughly established.”
Or, in other words, they explain that the subject-basis of emptiness is the
dependent, the object of negation of which it is empty is the imaginary, and
the phenomenon [which is characterized as] that subject [of emptiness]
being empty of that object of negation is the thoroughly established.44

This passage reiterates Shakya Chokden’s basic position that in the
Al k k rav da system the dependent is used as the subject-basis of emptiness and that it is empty of the imaginary in terms of other-emptiness, not
self-emptiness. But it also demonstrates that not only the imaginary but
the dependent too has to go in the process of negation: what is left as the
remainder of negation is not the dependent per se but only its entity—the
thoroughly established.
Thus, not only is the dependent a conglomerate of the other two
natures, but it is also a provisional or temporary conglomerate. Shakya
Chokden clearly treats it as a vehicle that transports the mind to the
cosmic expanse of the ultimate view, but is itself shattered into pieces
when the final Al k k rav da view is realized. The dependent is important as the basis of emptiness—the basis on which the imaginary is
negated. Nevertheless, when as a result of that negation one has reached
the final view of reality—the thoroughly established—then the dependent
also has to go, together with the imaginary. In that state the dualistic
appearances of apprehended and apprehender disappear and only the
clarity and cognition characterized by negation of those appearances
remain.

90 Journal of Buddhist Philosophy

Illusory and provisional as it is, the dependent is needed as a starting
point in the process of realizing emptiness. Were the thoroughly established
taken as the basis of emptiness from the start, its realization would be
impossible in the Yog c ra system as Shakya Chokden understands it. From
the Great Path of Ambrosia of Emptiness:
[The thoroughly established] is not posited as a subject-basis of emptiness,
because there is no proof and there are factors damaging to it. There is
no proof, because [valid] scriptures providing such explanation do not
exist. The damaging factors are as follows: if the reasoning establishing
emptiness had to establish the thoroughly established [taken as] the
subject[-basis of emptiness], as being empty of [both] the imaginary and
dependent [taken as] negated phenomena, it would follow that at the
time of ascertaining the subject-basis for dispute (rtsod gzhi’i chos can),
the probandum (bsgrub bya, s dhya) would have been proved. Otherwise,
there could exist a correct syllogism that establishes the probandum
without [initially] ascertaining the subject-basis for dispute.45

Because in the process of determining emptiness through reasoning the
subject-basis for dispute has to be ascertained before the mechanism of
a correct syllogism is triggered and its probandum is proved, it is wrong
to treat the thoroughly established as empty of the other two natures.
Were it taken as the subject-basis for dispute about whether the thoroughly
established is empty of the other two natures, then the probandum, “the
thoroughly established is empty of the other two natures,” would be
ascertained at the same moment that the subject-basis for dispute was
ascertained. The syllogism would simply prove what had already been
ascertained, and therefore would be defective.
Note that the context in which Shakya Chokden insists on retaining
the dependent as the basis of emptiness is that of positing emptiness
through reasoning. It is in this context that the dependent is needed
as the basis of negation. Nevertheless, the process of realizing emptiness does not stop there, but continues to eventually culminate in the
realization of ultimate reality in the meditative equipoise of ryas. It is
in this context that one directly realizes the thoroughly established, the
self-illuminating and self-cognizing primordial mind. It is described in
the Profound Thunder Amidst the Clouds of the Ocean of Definitive Meaning
as follows:
Honorable Asa ga explained as the de nitive meaning of the [last] two
dharmacakras
The non-dual primordial mind free from all proliferations,
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The self-illuminating self-cognition,
The nal ultimate [truth], the “Buddha-essence.”46

Not only is this primordial mind empty of all conventional phenomena,
not only is it nonconceptual, but it is also the only phenomenon that can
cognize primordial mind. In other words, it is self-cognizing. 47
Going all the way back to the rst citation in this paper, I should also
point out that the meaning of the term subject-basis of other-emptiness
changes depending on whether it is applied to the rst or the second
approach to other-emptiness articulated by Shakya Chokden. In the context
of determining emptiness through reasoning, it is the basis upon which
one negates the object of negation. Therefore, it is di erent from emptiness that is realized through that process. In the context of subsequent
realization of emptiness triggered by that process it is the emptiness itself,
the thoroughly established. That primordial mind—which is left as the
remainder of negation of the imaginary on the basis of the dependent—is
the basis of emptiness in terms of being an empty basis, the basis that is
emptied of everything else.
The forgoing discussion explains why in di erent statements scattered
throughout his works Shakya Chokden sometimes articulates the three
natures approach and sometimes the two natures approach. He adopts one
position or the other depending on which elements in the process of realization of reality he wants to emphasize. From the broader perspective of
his interpretation of the Yog c ra system, not only are the two approaches
not contradictory, but they actually complement each other. 48 One approach
pertains to positing emptiness through reasoning and unpacking details
of the process of reaching the ultimate. The other pertains to the level of
realization of the ultimate in the meditative equipoise of ryas.
The former approach is articulated, among others, by the following
statement from the Rain of Ambrosia:
[Al k k rav da] Yog c ras explain that the de nitive meaning of the
explicit teachings of the last pronouncement is that very primordial mind
[characterized by] the dependent being empty of the imaginary. They also
explain that this [primordial mind] itself is taught by the truly perfect
Buddha himself as the main topic of the middle pronouncement.49

The latter is articulated in the passage from the Seventeen Wondrous
Answers: “[H]aving determined all relative truths as self-empty, one posits
as remaining only the ultimate primordial mind (don dam pa’i ye shes).”50
Shakya Chokden also says that this approach stems from the explicit
teachings (dngos bstan) of the third dharmacakra and the Dharmas of
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Maitreya interpreted by Asa ga and Vasubandhu.51 What is emphasized in
either context is primordial mind, but in the former case Shakya Chokden
unpacks the process of accessing that primordial mind, while in the latter
he highlights the ultimate nature of primordial mind, which is empty of
all relative, conventional phenomena.
The earlier statement that the imaginary is empty of its own entity
while the dependent is empty of other entities should not be taken as
contradicting the statement in the last passage that Al k k rav da asserts
all relative truths or conventional phenomena as self-empty. This is because
the former statement was made in the three natures context while the latter
is made in the two natures context. In the former context the dependent
had to be posited as the basis of emptiness whose entity is di erent from
the object of negation. The second approach refers to the state in which
all phenomena have been boiled down to the two truths—relative and
ultimate—and the dependent has been split into the imaginary and thoroughly established that correspond to those truths. Were it possible to nd
the dependent apart from those two natures, the two approaches would
be contradictory. But because such is not possible, the second statement
does not imply that the dependent is self-empty. Rather, it presupposes
that there is no dependent apart from the self-empty dualistic appearances
(the imaginary) and the other-empty primordial mind (the thoroughly
established).
Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of the Al k k rav da approach to
other-emptiness can be summarized as follows. The dependent is comprised
of two parts: the imaginary part of nonexistent dualistically appearing
consciousness and the thoroughly established part of truly existent primordial mind quali ed by clarity and cognition. The latter is the entity of the
dependent but it does not overlap with it. The former does overlap with
it but it is not its entity. In the process of negation of the imaginary the
dependent evaporates too. After all, when one part of a pair is missing,
the pair itself also should disappear. More speci cally, all that remains
in the process of negation is the thoroughly established, which does not
overlap with the dependent. The imaginary does overlap with it, but disappears in the process of negation.
Shakya Chokden’s uid approach to the two versions of other-emptiness
clearly hinges on his understanding of the dependent. Two points in
particular—that the dependent is a conglomerate of the other two natures
and that it disappears in the process of negation of the imaginary—are
crucial for understanding why he nds the two approaches to otheremptiness to be noncontradictory. The two ways of dividing phenomena
utilized in the two approaches are not contradictory because the dependent
ultimately boils down to the other two natures.
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This boiling down happens not out of context but in the context of
determining the view of other-emptiness by reasoning and subsequently
realizing that view in contemplative practice culminating in the meditative equipoise of ryas. The dependent’s composite and transitory status
allows one to start with taking it as the basis of emptiness and negating
the imaginary on its basis, but in the process letting the dependent go as
well. When the part of dualistic appearances that is subsumed under the
imaginary evaporates, all that is left as the remainder is the clarity and
cognition part that is the thoroughly established. Thus, the three natures
approach is indispensable at the beginning of this process while the two
natures approach expresses its end result. The former is the prerequisite
for the latter, while the latter is the outcome of the former. Each one has
its place.
Before closing, I want to brie y address several elements found in
seminal Indian Yog c ra texts that can be seen as anticipating Shakya
Chokden’s interpretive approach. Those elements pertain to (1) the close
relationship between the three natures and the two truths, (2) di erent
approaches to the three natures, (3) the unreality and destructibility of the
dependent, (4) similes of the three natures, and (5) characteristics of the
dependent outlined in the Summary of Mah y na.
1. The three natures theory shares common origins with that of the two
truths. Elements of both can be found in the Prajñ p ramit s tras.52 The
two truths and the three natures are likewise connected in such Yog c ra
texts as Maitreya’s Di erentiation of the Middle and Extremes (which presents only the thoroughly established as a t candidate for the ultimate
truth)53 and Maitreya’s Ornament of Mah y na S tras54 with its commentary
by Vasubandhu55 (which categorize the dependent together with the imaginary as a phenomenal, conventional aspect of reality).56
Having formed both in response to—and as a further expansion of—the
two truths theory,57 the three natures theory can be approached as its
elaborate extension. Although the two theories have di erent emphases
and perspectives—the three natures are more concerned with dynamic
epistemological processes of conceiving unreality and realizing reality,
while the two truths focus on ontology—they are not incompatible. As if
folding and unfolding a fan, the former can be reduced to the latter and the
latter expanded to the former. This feature no doubt contributed to Shakya
Chokden’s claim of the lack of contradiction between the three natures
model and the two natures model.
2. The philosophical focuses of the basic Yog c ra texts appear to be
di erent,58 and the three natures theory in particular is far from being
clear-cut, having undergone extensive changes over time. 59 Any one
articulation of this theory is complicated by the fact that it was developed

94 Journal of Buddhist Philosophy

by di erent authors with diverse philosophical outlooks during di erent
historical periods.60
Similar to di erent models of the two truths, models of the three natures
are far from being uniform, providing various interpretations of their
relationship and identity. Alan Sponberg, for example, delineates three
models of the three natures: the pivotal model that is based primarily
on the second chapter of the Summary of Mah y na, the progressive
model that came to be standard in the later East Asian tradition, and
the model articulated by the Chinese thinker K’uei-chi that has parts of
both of those models. The rst model places emphasis on the dependent:
while progressing on the path, one undergoes an epistemic shift from the
imaginary to the thoroughly established (the two being understood as
two mutually exclusive aspects of the dependent), but ontologically, the
dependent is neither rejected nor, strictly speaking, transcended in the
process. According to the second model, one rst transcends or cuts o
the imaginary, but then also transcends or cuts o the dependent, thereby
nally attaining the thoroughly established, which lies beyond the conventional reality of the dependent.61
The rst two models can be traced to Indian Yog c ra texts. According
to Klaus-Dieter Mathes, for example, Maitreya’s Di erentiation of the Middle
and Extremes contains two models of the three natures that come close to
Sponberg’s pivotal and progressive models.62 According to Mario D’Amato,
the Ornament of Mah y na S tras and its commentary by Vasubandhu
propose the soteriologico-ontological model of the three natures that
identi es stages of ontological gnosis traversed in the process of achieving
buddhahood. One starts by moving from the level of the imaginary
constructed by ordinary beings to the level of the dependent, where one
realizes the nonexistence of conceptually constructed entities but accepts
the conventional existence of an interdependent web of causes and conditions that serve as their basis. Eventually, one reaches the level of the
thoroughly established—buddhahood—where the basis of the matrix of
conceptual construction has been abandoned.63
According to Sponberg, the progressive model stands in marked contrast
to the approach of the Summary of Mah y na, because that text argues
that there can be no thoroughly established without the existence of the
dependent.64 Nevertheless, the Summary of Mah y na’s position does not
necessarily have to be interpreted as indicating that the dependent should
persist even when the thoroughly established has been fully realized. It can
be understood as the dependent being indispensible only as a temporary
basis of that realization. One can further argue that the text’s interpretation of the snake-rope-hemp simile (see below) in its third chapter also
strongly suggests the progressive model of the three natures.
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Because seminal Yog c ra texts allow for di erent interpretations of their
positions on the three natures—as illustrated by the pivotal and progressive
models—it is not surprising that later commentators attempted to stress
their chosen models of the three natures over others, or to synthesize
elements of di erent models. According to Sponberg, K’uei-chi utilized
elements of both dynamic and progressive models by retaining the dynamic
role of the dependent while shifting focus to the thoroughly established. As
we have seen, Shakya Chokden in his own way attempted to reconcile two
di erent models where the key role played by the dependent in realization of reality is retained, but the emphasis is eventually shifted to the
thoroughly established.
3. One of the main reasons why di erent models of the three natures
are possible is the ambiguous status of the dependent. The widespread
Yog c ra position—accepted by Shakya Chokden as well—is that the
dependent appears as the imaginary, while the thoroughly established is
understood as the nonexistence of the dependent the way it appears—the
nonexistence, that is, of the imaginary in the dependent. According to this
scenario, the imaginary does not exist while the thoroughly established
always exists. This state of a airs does not change regardless of whether
or not the realization of the thoroughly established has been achieved and
the appearance of the imaginary eliminated. The dependent, in contrast,
performs many contradictory roles, and its existence is either admitted or
negated depending on context.
The dependent serves as the basis of the emergence of dualistic
appearances—the imaginary. It likewise serves as the basis of realizing
the nonexistence of the imaginary—realizing the thoroughly established.
While its illusion-like status is admitted, in its role as this twofold basis the
dependent is neither negated nor eliminated. It also continues to appear in
the postmeditative state of subsequent attainment (rjes thob, p halabdha)
even after the direct realization of reality has taken place. This being
said, it is not destined to exist forever in this or any other role: it ceases
or is transformed when the magic show of sa s ra is over and a buddha’s
nirv a—the ultimate goal of the Mah y na path—has been achieved. It is
this nal transformation of the dependent—the last role it is to play—that
brings about the resultant state of buddhahood.
From among these and other characteristics of the dependent, two
gure prominently in such seminal Yog c ra texts as the S tra Unraveling
the Intent, 65 Ornament of Mah y na S tras (with its commentary by
Vasubandhu), and Thirty Stanzas. The rst is that the dependent does not
have real existence and exists only as an illusion; the second is that upon
its nal transformation the dependent ceases to exist. According to the
Ornament of Mah y na S tras and its commentary by Vasubandhu, for
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example, the dependent does not ultimately exist and is to be abandoned,
destroyed through the knowledge of the three natures as they are.66 The
Summary of Mah y na likens the dependent to a mirage, a re ection,
etc.67 The S tra Unraveling the Intent, too, likens it to a phantom, magical
creation, etc.,68 and argues that eventually it is to be eliminated.69
What these two features signify is that when all illusion-like states of
mind have been eliminated and the nal result of the path achieved, the
dependent ceases and thereby becomes equal to the imaginary in terms of
both of them being nonexistent. Only the thoroughly established persists
forever: prior to buddhahood it exists as the state of nonexistence of the
imaginary in the dependent, and afterward it exists also as the state free
from both the imaginary and the dependent. These two features lend
support to Shakya Chokden’s claim that the three natures can be reduced
to the two natures, and that in the process of negation of the imaginary on
the basis of the dependent, the dependent has to go too, and what remains
after that negation is only the thoroughly established.
4. Although similes can illustrate actual things only to a limited extent
and allow for di erent interpretations, three well-known similes of the
three natures—the snake-rope-hemp, gold-ore, and magic show 70 —serve
well to clarify the above-mentioned characteristics of the dependent and
its relationship to the other two natures.
The rst simile demonstrates that similar to a rope serving as a basis
for a mistaken appearance of a snake and subsequent realization of the
snake’s nonexistence in the rope, the dependent serves as the basis for
appearance of the imaginary and subsequent realization of its nonexistence
in the dependent. The simile further points out that what is “really out
there” is not even the rope but only strands of hemp and other elements
that comprise the rope, illustrating that in reality only the thoroughly
established exists while the dependent does not.71 It thereby rst demonstrates the basal, pivotal role of the dependent, but then shifts emphasis
to the perspective of the thoroughly established, in which the dependent
has been transcended.
A similar mechanism is at play in the gold-ore simile used to illustrate the
Summary of Mah y na’s statement that the dependent is comprised of two
parts: the imaginary and the thoroughly established. The gold-bearing ore
(the dependent) initially appears simply as clay (the imaginary), but when
it has been burned with re (nonconceptual realization of ultimate reality),
gold (the thoroughly established) appears and clay disappears. Here too we
can see the emphasis on the basal, pivotal role of the dependent illustrated
by the ore appearing rst as clay and then as gold. But note the dynamics at
play here: similar to the gold-ore that appears as mere clay, the dependent
appears as the imaginary. Yet, when the clay has been burned down, all
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that remains is not even the ore but only pure gold. Likewise, when the
dependent has been burned with the re of nonconceptual wisdom, all that
remains is the thoroughly established.72 Thus, while indicating the pivotal
role of the dependent, this simile also demonstrates that after the pivoting
has taken place, the pivot—the dependent—itself disappears.
In the magic show simile, the appearance of the magically created
elephant stands for the dependent, the magically created elephant itself
stands for the imaginary, and the wood, etc. stand for the thoroughly
established.73 Here, the basal role of the dependent is limited only to its
projecting the imaginary, and from the start the emphasis is put on the thoroughly established that serves as the basis of both the dependent and the
imaginary. Similar to a magically created elephant and its appearance, these
two natures arise together and disappear together, while the thoroughly
established, similar to pieces of wood, pebbles, etc., persists throughout.74
All three similes can be interpreted as illustrating the unreality of the
dependent and its destructibility, and the gold-ore simile in particular
demonstrates the composite character of the dependent that plays the key
role in Shakya Chokden’s approach to the three natures.
5. Because Shakya Chokden believes that his interpretation of the
dependent as a composite of the other two natures is supported by
Asa ga’s Summary of Mah y na, it is worth taking a closer look at that
text’s perspectives on the dependent. According to Noritoshi Aramaki,
these perspectives can be summarized in nine categories: (1) the
basis of appearance of all phenomena (sarvadharmapratibh s raya),
(2) dependent origination (prat t yasamut p da), (3) mere cognizance
(vijñaptim trat ), (4) neither di erent nor non-di erent [from the other
two natures] (na bhinno n py abhinna ), (5) like magical illusion, etc.
(m y divat), (6) pertaining to a ictions and pertaining to puri cation
(sa kle
iko vyavad n
ika ca), (7) the object known in subsequent
attainment ( la bana p halabdha jñ nasya), (8) nonabiding nirv a
(aprati hitanirv a), and (9) dharma-body (dharmak ya).75 (As is clear from
the list, most of these categories characterize the dependent itself while
others are only related to it.) 76
The nine categories demonstrate characteristics of the dependent in
general, and in particular the ones emphasized in this paper. Category 1
refers to the dependent in terms of its general function as a basis of manifesting phenomenal appearances, while category 2 refers to its character of
dependent origination. Category 3 refers to the mental “stu ” it is made of,
category 4 refers to its close and interdependent relationship with the other
two natures, and category 5 refers to the fact that it is unreal and illusory.
Category 6 refers to its being comprised of the contradictory elements of
a ictions and their puri cation. Category 7 refers to it as an object of mind
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that arises subsequent to the direct realization of reality. Category 8 refers
to it as a composite of the imaginary and thoroughly established natures
and uses this as the reason for the Buddha teaching the inseparability of
sa s ra and nirv a. And category 9 refers to its nal transformation as a
result of the path—the state where the dependent belonging to the a icted
part has been eliminated and the dependent belonging to the puri ed part
has been assumed.
Categories 1–5 and 7 hardly require additional comment. As for categories 6, 8, and 9, together they demonstrate an important feature of the
dependent: while being a composite of the other two natures, it will not
last in this role forever, because eventually its a icted, sa s ric part will
be destroyed, and only the puri ed, nirv ic part retained.77 As we already
know, according to the Summary of Mah y na, the puri ed part of the
dependent is the thoroughly established.
Embedded in the interconnected web of Yog c ra ideas, these ve
elements (1–5) provided a fertile ground for the uid approach to the three
natures developed by Shakya Chokden. To recapitulate, this approach was
anticipated by the possibility of reducing the three natures to the two
truths/natures, the lack of real existence of the dependent, the composite
character of the dependent, the destructibility of the dependent, and the
eventual shift of emphasis to the thoroughly established as a result of
progress on the path. Although Shakya Chokden worked in a historical,
social, and philosophical milieu very di erent from that of the authors
of the Yog c ra works mentioned above, and although his is only one
among many possible interpretations of the three natures and related ideas
contained in those works, in his interpretive approach he clearly built upon,
responded to, and further articulated those ideas.

Notes
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For the discussion of di erences between Saty k rav da and Al k k rav da
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11. For details see chapters 3 and 4 of Visions of Unity. While Shakya Chokden
highlights unique features of the Sublime Continuum that make it superior to
other Yog c ra works (writing, for example, that it contains all de nitive mean-
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gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid rnam par log na sgrib pa thams cad las rnam par
grol zhing chos thams cad la dbang sgyur ba nye bar gnas pa rnam par byang

ba’i char gtogs pa gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid du gyur pa’i phyir ro; ibid.,
37b). Nevertheless, one should note that the Summary of Mah y na refers to

the dependent nature as follows: “What is the dependent’s characteristic? It is
the cognizance subsumed under the unreal ideation possessing the seed of the

storehouse consciousness (gzhan gyi dbang gi msthan nyid gang zhe na // gang

kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i sa bon can yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pas bsdus
pa’i rnam par rig pa’o. Ibid., 13a). Because the unreal ideation in general, and
the storehouse consciousness with its seeds in particular, are eliminated in the
state of buddhahood, the same should apply to the dependent. Note too that
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the

rst passage cited in this footnote mentions generation of the antidote of

the dependent, thereby also presupposing its eventual destruction. Based on
the composite character of the dependent and its eventual destructibility, one

can argue that the puri ed dependent is no more the dependent than a dead

human is a human. (Whether a dead human [shi ba’i mi] is a human [mi] is a
fun debate topic used by beginner debaters in Tibetan monastic institutions.)

According to Buddhism, a human is comprised of, among other things, the
physical body and consciousness. Because at death consciousness leaves the

body, a dead human is not, properly speaking, a human. In a similar vein,

because, according to the Summary of Mah y na, the dependent consists of

both a

icted and puri ed elements, sa s ric and nirv

because at the nal transformation its a

ic elements, etc., and

icted, sa s ric, imaginary elements

cease, the transformed dependent is not, properly speaking, the dependent.
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